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Introduction 
Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe: a framework for analysis  
  
Wilfried Swenden and Bart Maddens 
 
(published in Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe, edited by 
Wilfried Swenden and Bart Maddens and published with Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2009; final draft minor modifications made in printed version) 
 
[A] Mind the Gap: Bridging Regionalization and Party (System) Literatures 
 
In recent decades, social scientists have argued that in Western Europe, 
government and governance should be increasingly understood from a multi-layered 
perspective. The EU has developed into an important supranational regulator, leading one 
American observer to label it as a ‘regulatory’ federation (Kelemen, 2004). 
Simultaneously authority has migrated to sub-state levels of government, strengthening 
regions in Western Europe in terms of their constitutional, legislative, administrative or 
fiscal capacity (Keating, 1998 and 2001; Greer, 2006; Swenden, 2006, Hooghe, Marks 
and Schakel, 2008). Although this process has developed far from evenly across all 
member-states of the EU, it has affected most of its largest and/or multi-national 
members (Belgium, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain). The strengthening of the 
regional tier is self-evident by studying recent constitutional developments in countries 
like Belgium (Deschouwer, 2005; Swenden and Jans, 2006), Spain (Aja, 2004; Moreno 
2001, Colino, forthcoming), the UK (Hazell, 2000; Trench, 2004) or Italy (Gold, 2003; 
Palermo 2005). Yet, even Germany – sometimes portrayed as a ‘unitary state in all but 
name’ (Abromeit, 1992) seems to be decentralizing, a development linked to growing 
socio-economic divisions between its regions which dramatically intensified after 
unification (Sturm, 2001; Benz, 2006, Detterbeck and Jeffery in this volume). Several 
reasons have been put forward to account for this development: economists highlight that 
regions or small states are better placed to compete in a context where trade liberalization 
has made traditional state boundaries more porous and intensified competition for foreign 
investment or best innovation practices (Ohmae, 1995, Porter, 1998, Alesina and 
Spolaore, 2003). Policy analysts point at new modes of decision-making in which 
authority diffuses from hierarchical structures into non hierarchical policy networks 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Bomberg and Peterson, 1999; Peters and Pierre, 2005). 
Political sociologists point at the reawakening of territorial and linguistic cleavages in a 
more secular Western Europe from which communism has largely disappeared.  
The importance of regional or sub-state territory in Western Europe stands in 
apparent contradiction with the scholarly literature on party systems, party organizations 
and electoral campaigning. Much of the recent party system literature has focused on the 
extent to which such systems have become more or less nationalized (Caramani, 2004; 
Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Jones and Mainwaring, 2003; Thorlakson, 2007). For 
instance, using an exhaustive database of electoral results at the constituency level from 
nearly all West European states, Caramani found that Lipset and Rokkan’s ‘frozen party 
system’ thesis still holds today (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Despite several decades of 
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regionalization and growing electoral volatility, party families built upon the cleavages 
generated by the National and Industrial Revolutions continue to dominate the 
contemporary West European party landscapes. Parties became ‘catch-all-over-parties’ 
(that is, sought to gain votes across the electoral constituencies of the state) before 
developing into mass or catch-all parties (Caramani, 2004).  
Similarly, until recently, the party organizational literature largely ignored how 
parties organize at the regional level (even though analyses of the elite party, mass party, 
catch-all party or cartel party may describe how parties organize locally, Katz and Mair, 
1993 and 1995; Krouwel, 2006). Processes of candidate selection have been studied 
primarily with statewide, less so with regional electoral contests in mind (Gallagher, and 
Marsh 1988; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Bille, 2001). Classifications like the party in public 
office’ are concerned primarily with the party in central government or with MPs in the 
statewide legislatures in mind. How parties organize regionally is better known for those 
parties which self-evidently organize at that level in the first place: the ethno-regionalist 
or autonomist parties of Western Europe (De Winter and Türsan, 1998, De Winter, 
Gomez-Reino and Lynch, 2006; Hepburn, forthcoming).  
   Finally, regions have been largely left out of the principal theories of electoral 
competition or campaigning. Most of these theories (like the proximity theory, directional 
theory or issue ownership theory) make predictions with respect to campaign strategies at 
one level of policy-making, usually the statewide or federal policy level. Hence, they 
disregard the extent to which campaigns may be conditioned by campaign realities in 
different electoral arenas. Furthermore, although theories of electoral competition could 
be applied to the regional level of government, they are rarely tested at this level. For 
instance, expert surveys measuring policy positions of voters or party elites primarily do 
so with statewide elections or statewide politics in mind. Similarly, the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (CMP) maps the policy positions and issue salience of party programs 
based on their general or statewide election manifestos (Budge et al., 2001). Recent 
efforts to broaden the scope of CMP data have focused on the new democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe, much less so on how the CMP could be meaningfully 
applied to regional or local elections (Klingemann et al., 2006, but Pogorelis et al., 2005). 
One of the principal aims of this book is to narrow the gap between the 
regionalization and the party literatures on Western Europe. The latter has retained - 
notwithstanding several contributions in recent years, particularly in the field of party 
organizational studies – a strong ‘national’ focus (Jeffery and Hough, 2003; Hough and 
Jeffery, 2006a). We argue that as a result of the process of regionalization described 
above, regional elections have gained in significance, regional political elites have 
become increasingly professionalized and parties are under increasing pressure to adapt 
their internal organization and campaign strategies to such new realities. In sum, 
regionalization has influenced the nature of the party system and the way in which parties 
organize and campaign in statewide and especially regional elections.  
In this volume we cannot possibly bring together a comprehensive analysis of the 
territorial aspects of all party systems or parties in all West European countries. 
Therefore, the focus of this book is limited in two respects: first in the type of parties that 
are analyzed and second, in the countries that are selected for in depth or comparative 
analysis. With respect to the type of parties that are analyzed, this book focuses on  
statewide parties alone. We define statewide parties as parties which participate in 
 3 
statewide and regional elections and are represented in at least three quarters of the 
regions in the state. We primarily focus on statewide parties because we believe that they 
face the most challenging coordination issues in terms of policy-making, organization 
and campaigning. This is so, because they seek to maximize their following in statewide 
and regional elections, participate in government or influence policy in as many regions 
of the state as possible  
With respect to the selection of countries, the empirical evidence that is brought 
together in this volume relates to the territorial dimension of party politics in Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and Great Britain. As such it does not cover all West European 
states with a federal or regionalized character (for instance, Austria, Switzerland but also 
France are lacking from the analysis). Although this constrains the generalisability of our 
findings, our sample contains some of the (leading) West European states with an 
(increasingly) significant regional tier of government. For this reason, the analytical 
framework below only uses examples taken from the countries that are covered by this 
volume.  
Before presenting an analytical framework that ties together the various 
contributions to this volume, just a brief note on what we mean by ‘region’. We see 
regions as the key meso-level of government in the state (sometimes called Land, 
Autonomous Community, Community or Region, province, ‘nation’ or canton). In 
general, we denote elections at that level as ‘regional elections’. By comparison, we use 
the term state to denote the highest level of governance; elections which take place at that 
level are considered as statewide (and not ‘national’ or general) elections.  
 
[A] Party Systems in a Multi-Layered Context, from a ‘national’ to a ‘multi-level’ 
party system 
 
[B] The national bias in nationalization studies  
 
 In recent years, much of the party system literature in Western Europe focused on 
the so-called ‘nationalization’ of the West European party system. Caramani’s influential 
study in this regard is based on an exhaustive collection and analysis of electoral data at 
the constituency or district level. His findings point at the overall nationalization of 
Western European party systems, that is, an increasing homogenization of electoral 
competition across the regional units of the state (Caramani, 2004: 42). However, he 
mentions some exceptions. For instance, he acknowledges that in more recent times a 
tendency towards ‘de-nationalization’ can be observed, at least in multi-national 
democracies such as Britain, Belgium and Italy. Using a broader variety of indicators to 
analyze party nationalization, Caramani finds a more denationalizing British party system 
since the 1990s, at least compared with the average observed for the entire post World 
War II period. This is consistent with Chhibber and Kollman, who, in a different study, 
observed a peak in the nationalization of the British party system during the 1960s and 
1970s, before they recorded a substantial decline (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004: 196-7). 
Denationalization is also observed for Belgium and - albeit to a much lesser extent - Italy 
(with relative stabilization after the implosion of the Christian-Democrats and the rise of 
the Lega in the early 1990s).  
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Importantly, Caramani recorded no significant overall changes in the 
nationalization of the Spanish party system since 1978. Similarly, the German party 
system has not become more ‘denationalized’ after unification (at least until 1999). In the 
league of West European party systems, Germany did not climb up the ladder of 
denationalization: in 1999 it still ranked behind Belgium, Switzerland, Finland, Britain, 
Spain and Italy. The cumulative standard deviation, that is, the extent to which 
constituency results for all German parties deviate from the overall mean, did not 
increase between 1990 and 1999. Thus, the German party system did not become more 
territorially fragmented in relative and absolute terms (Caramani ,2004: 92-3).  
Caramani’s observations on Spain sound counterintuitive given this country’s 
“federalization” in recent years (Moreno, 2001). Similarly one would expect that the 
rising inter-regional socio-economic heterogeneity in Germany after unification would 
have coincided with a less ‘nationalized’ party system. Why do nationalization studies 
seem to contradict these expectations?  
First, and most importantly, although not all nationalization studies use identical 
indicators, all of them are based on results for statewide elections alone. Yet, regional 
elections in Belgium, Germany, Spain or Italy have been (or have become increasingly) 
relevant given that regional governments frequently control important aspects of capital 
intensive policies such as education, industrial development, transport, infrastructure, 
health or social assistance. Therefore, to disregard regional election results is to leave out 
an (increasingly) important component of party system nationalization. Developments in 
the regional party systems must be considered as an essential component of party 
systemic developments in a federal or multi-layered state. 
Second, most nationalization studies are based on overall aggregate national 
patterns. By doing so, they cannot fully account for the potential importance of limited or 
aberrant ‘nationalization’ in strong regions such as Catalonia, Scotland, the Basque 
Country, Wales or even Bavaria that represent relatively small sections of the population, 
but play a key role in triggering the (further) decentralization of the state. Hence, 
Chhibber and Kollman make claims about the entire British party system, but Scotland 
and Wales represent such a small share of the overall electorate that their findings cannot 
fully bear out the peculiarity of the Scottish and Welsh electorates. Until the 2001 
statewide elections, only 6.9 percent of all British constituencies were Scottish (and thus 
constituted a support base for the Scottish National Party) and only about 4.3 percent 
were Welsh. Similarly, many Spanish parties have a small statewide following but due to 
their regionally concentrated support can be significant forces within their regional party 
system: most non-state wide parties cover less than nine percent of the Spanish 
constituencies (Caramani, 2004: 113; Montero, 2005). In Germany, the Bavarian CSU 
has had a more profound impact than the East German PDS in pushing the German 
nationalization index down. Yet, it does not take an electoral specialist to realize that the 
East German party system is profoundly different from that which is found in the rest of 
the country. Related to this point, the ‘nationalization’ thesis cannot map -to borrow from 
Sartori and Bartolini - the regional ‘blackmail potential’ of autonomist parties (Sartori, 
1976; Bartolini, 2004). Aggregated ‘nationalization’ indices do not express the relevance 
of these parties at the statewide level where they can wield significant political influence 
(see further). For instance, the need of Spanish central minority governments to rely on 
the legislative support of one or several autonomist parties during most of the 1990s and 
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again since 2004 has played a role in explaining more recent developments in the Spanish 
decentralization process (see further). 
 
[B] The Party system as a Multi-Level Party System 
 
To remedy this deficiency in party system nationalization studies, Gibson and 
Suarez-Cao recently introduced the concept of a ‘federalized party system’, which they 
define as ‘a party system in which more than one territorially delimited party system 
operates’, that is a national [statewide] and several sub-national [regional] ones (Gibson 
and Suarez-Cao, 2007: 6). We suggest using the concept of a multi-level party system to 
denote what Gibson and Suarez-Cao perceive as a federalized party system. The multi-
level party system brings together a statewide party system which emerges from 
statewide elections and a set of regional party systems reflecting the outcome for regional 
elections. Both authors concur with our viewpoint that nationalization studies are 
incomplete so long as they do not take into account developments in the regional party 
system and incorporate their interaction with the statewide party system.  
It is not difficult to see how reconceptualizing a party system as a ‘multi-level 
party system’ can shed a different perspective on the nationalization studies reviewed 
above: using the framework of a multi-level party system we need to consider the 
properties of the regional party systems and analyze how they interact with each other 
and with the statewide party system. Similarly, we must take into account developments 
in the regional party systems when measuring party system change. Party system change 
is defined by Peter Mair as the transformation of a party system from one class or type of 
party system into another (Mair, 1997: 52). However, also in this regard change is 
primarily understood as change resulting from transformations of the statewide party 
system alone; for instance, to use Sartori’s classification scheme, from a system of 
moderate into one of polarized pluralism (Sartori, 2005: 116-92). Yet, multi-level party 
system change could also occur if party competition at the regional level transforms the 
direction of competition or produces a change of governing formula at that level. For 
instance, the election of an SNP minority government in Scotland in May 2007 certainly 
produced party system change at the Scottish level since it forced Labour into joint 
opposition with the Conservatives and Liberals. This certainly generated a change in the 
direction of competition, notwithstanding the already distinctive character of the Scottish 
party system prior to such a change in the Scottish governing formula. Party competition 
is now structured along ‘the regionalist issue’: that is the extent to which Scottish 
autonomy should be extended or Scottish independence should be contemplated. 
The integration of a multi-level party system depends on the extent to which the 
same parties are represented at the various levels of the system and the degree to which 
their support is evenly balanced across the levels and regions of the state. A multi-level 
party system is fully integrated if the same parties are represented at the statewide and 
regional levels in about equal strength. A multi-level party system is loosely integrated if 
the support for statewide parties varies considerably across the regions and between the 
state-wide and regional levels, for instance, due to the presence of regional parties. In the 
extreme case of a completely disintegrated system, each region has a specific party-




[B] Patterns of Interaction in a Multi-Level Party System 
 
The interaction between the component parts of a multi-level party system can 
take on several forms. The simplest distinction relates to patterns of vertical interaction 
between the statewide and regional party system. That interaction may take on a ‘top-
down’ or ‘bottom up’ direction. In comparison, patterns of horizontal interaction consider 
the impact which regional party systems have on each other.   
We start with considering the relevance of vertical interaction from ‘a top-down 
perspective,’ pertaining to the extent to which developments in the statewide party system 
affect the regional party systems. The notion that the outcome of a regional election is 
primary influenced by statewide politics is dealt with in the literature on regional 
elections as ‘second order elections’. For long regional elections were seen to be of 
second order relative to statewide elections because they generated lower turnout levels, 
boosted support for new or minor parties and, especially when held halfway through the 
statewide election cycle, harmed central level incumbents and benefited central 
opposition parties (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Hough and Jeffery, 2006a: 7-10). Recent 
empirical evidence demonstrates that regional elections in Western Europe still generate 
lower turnout levels and that, on the whole, this gap has not been narrowing (López 
Pintor, Gratschew, et al., 2002: 78-9; Font and Rico, 2003; Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 
s.d.; UK Electoral Commission). However, evidence to support ‘second orderness’ on the 
other indicators is less persuasive. For instance, after German unification, central 
incumbents still suffer setbacks in German regional elections when held halfway through 
the statewide election cycle, but the key central opposition parties may not benefit as 
much as the second order model predicts (Lutz Kern and Hainmüller, 2006: 127-49; 
Hough and Jeffery, 2006b: 119-39). Furthermore, the proportion of the German electorate 
in regional elections that would have to change its vote to produce the same outcome as 
for federal elections has gone up. Similar observations have been made with respect to 
regional elections in Spain and the UK. In Spain, the share of voters who support 
autonomist parties is much higher in regional than in statewide elections (Pallarés and 
Keating, 2006). The same practice of ‘dual voting’ can be observed in Scotland and 
Wales, where SNP and Plaid Cymru score much better in regional elections, in part 
because larger shares of Labour and Conservative voters (in statewide elections) prefer to 
stay at home (Bromley, 2006: 197-9; Trystan, Scully and Wyn Jones, 2003). These 
examples attest that statewide and regional party systems do not necessarily respond to 
the logic of ‘second orderness’. Indeed, it has been argued that voters in West European 
states increasingly perceive regional elections as electoral contests in their own right, 
instead of seeing them as ‘popularity tests’ for incumbent central governments (Hough 
and Jeffery, 2006a). 
Second orderness focuses on the short term spill over effects of developments in 
the statewide party system on the regional party systems. Yet, it is not difficult to see how 
some of these developments may generate more durable effects. For instance, if parties, 
as Caramani attests, develop a ‘catch-all-over-strategy’ first in statewide elections, then 
they are likely to seek such a strategy in regional elections as well. For instance, no one 
ever questioned the theoretical possibility that the British statewide would not participate 
in devolved elections in Scotland and Wales, whereas their absence from devolved 
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elections for Northern Ireland was widely expected.  Indeed, each of the three statewide 
parties (Labour, Liberals and Conservatives) had participated in statewide or Westminster 
elections in Scotland and Wales, but did not file candidates in UK elections in Northern 
Ireland. Conversely, parties which suffer badly or face extinction in statewide elections 
may ultimately also disappear from the regional party system. This was the case for 
instance in Spain, where during the eighties the centrist CDS could initially maintain a 
strong position in some regions.  However, the continuing poor results at the state-wide 
level eventually forced the party into oblivion.  
Vertical interactions in the federal party system can also take on a bottom up 
direction; hence, developments in the regional party system can trigger changes in the 
statewide party system. For instance, notwithstanding the earlier mentioned practice of 
dual voting, some voters would not have supported autonomist parties in Spanish 
elections if they had not been successful already in regional elections also. As a result, 
Spanish minority governments felt compelled to negotiate with these parties, instead of 
signing coalition pacts with the (larger) statewide party competitor. This way, parties that 
appeared at the regional level acquired a powerful brokerage (or, as alluded to above, 
‘blackmail’) potential in the centre and extracted regional resources in exchange for 
supporting a statewide government (but Montero 2005, for a more critical analysis).   
Also, the collapse of the Spanish UCD at the national level in the beginning of the 
eighties was due in part to the disastrous results of the party in the first regional elections, 
preceding the 1982 national election (Hopkin, 1999: 221-225). Or, to list another 
example, the input of the East German regions in the governance of the German federal 
centre is somehow disproportionate. The Bundesrat, the federal second chamber, provides 
the East German regional executives with an important co-decision right in 
approximately 50 percent of all federal legislation (a percentage that is said to go down as 
a result of a recent federalism reform package). Through its participation in several 
regional governments (in coalition with the SPD), the PDS obtained important 
concessions from the SPD-Green controlled federal government (1998-2005) in tax or 
health care reform (Zöhnlhofer, 2003). More in general, the PDS can bring specific East 
German concerns to bear when in a position to co-decide on labour, health care, tax or 
fiscal equalization reforms at the federal policy level. Germany also illustrates that some 
parties (such as the Greens) may achieve electoral success and governmental 
representation at the regional level first, thereby paving the way to statewide electoral 
success and a role in federal government at a later stage.  
Next to patterns of vertical interaction between statewide and regional party 
systems, we may consider the degree to which elections in one region influence elections 
in another. Again, the support for autonomist parties in Spain has become more wide-
spread during the 1980s and early 1990s. Yet, this was primarily a consequence of the 
rapid growth of such parties in the non-historic communities (such as the Canary Islands 
or Aragon) rather than of the further rise of such parties in the historic communities 
(Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia) (Pallarés and Keating, 2003 and 2006). Thus, 
the emergence of autonomist parties in the historic communities created a ‘snowball 
effect’ triggering their breakthrough in other regional elections as well.     
 
[A] Statewide Parties as an element of linkage between the subsystems of the multi-
level party system 
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[B]. Definition and Typology of Statewide Parties  
 
The sub-systems of a multi-level party system (the statewide party system and the 
party systems within each of the regions of the state) interact with each other, vertically 
and horizontally. Parties are the most important elements of linkage between the 
statewide and regional party systems; other linkages may consist of ‘communication 
flows, resource flows, [congruent or partially congruent] coalitions, electoral laws and so 
on.’ (Gibson and Suarez-Cao, 2007: 7). 
However, not all parties provide an equally strong element of linkage between the 
statewide and regional systems of the multi-level party system. The linkage potential of a 
party is dependent on two factors: first, the territorial reach and depth of the party defined 
as the territorial pervasiveness of its electoral support and the type (statewide and/or 
regional) of elections in which it participates and second, the strength of the 
organizational linkages between the statewide and regional party branches.  
Focusing on the first element alone, Kris Deschouwer (2006b: 292) suggested 
classifying parties along two dimensions: the territorial pervasiveness of the party (do 
parties gain political representation at one, several or all the regions of the state), and the 
presence of a party at different levels of the political system (do parties exclusively 
participate in regional or statewide elections, or do they take part in both)? The linkage 
potential is highest for parties with a high territorial pervasiveness and a presence at all 
levels of the political system. This is largely the case for statewide parties. Statewide 
parties can be distinguished from ‘truncated’ parties, which are parties that only exist at 
one level of government (Thorlakson, forthcoming-a). By comparison, although most 
autonomist parties take part in statewide and regional elections (thus they are not 
truncated), their political representation is limited to one or at most a few regions of the 
state. Table 0.1 provides a summary overview and classifies those parties which will be 
discussed or mentioned in forthcoming chapters (therefore, it does not provide a summary 
overview of all West European parties).  
 
Table 0.1 about here 
 
A quick look at table 1 reveals that while most parties participate in statewide and 
regional electoral contests, parties display a much broader variety with respect to their 
territorial pervasiveness. For instance, the largest British, German and Spanish parties 
compete in statewide and regional elections and are present across most regions of the 
state. In the UK, Labour, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats do not compete in 
Northern Ireland (UK and devolved elections), but are present in Scotland, Wales and 
England. The German Christian-Democrats do not compete in Bavaria (federal and 
regional elections) but participate in statewide and regional elections across the remaining 
fifteen regions of the state. In Spain, the PSOE and PP compete across all regions of the 
state but the Catalan Social Democrats (PSC) and Naverrese Conservatives (UPN) 
nonetheless have a special status: they operate as autonomous parties in Catalan or 
Navarrese elections.   
Conversely, a majority of the autonomist parties (for instance the Catalan CiU and 
ERC, the Basque PNV and EA, the Galician BNG, the Scottish SNP or Welsh PC) 
participate in statewide elections and in one set of regional elections and gain 
 9 
representation at both levels. Parties such as the Italian Lega Nord or Alleanza Nationale 
or the East German PDS are to be distinguished from the previous set of autonomist 
parties insofar as they pervade more than just one region, yet have a geographically 
concentrated support base (Northern or Southern Italy, East Germany). Similarly, Belgian 
parties participate in federal and regional elections but do not cover the entire territory of 
the state. Their electoral support is confined to Flanders and Brussels or to Wallonia and 
Brussels. Therefore, on the basis of territorial pervasiveness and presence alone, the 
‘Belgian’ parties should be positioned with most of the West European autonomist parties 
(but see the contributions by Deschouwer and Verleden to this volume for why most 
parties lack some additional properties that are commonly associated with such 
autonomist or ethno-regionalist parties). Leaving aside Belgium, the multi-level party 
systems of Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany are still dominated by parties with a 
statewide character. This is the case even for most regional party systems. With the 
exception of Bavaria, the Basque Country and Navarre, statewide parties still capture a 
majority of votes in regional elections. The representation of autonomist parties is high in 
Catalonia, the Canary Islands, Scotland or Wales, but lower than that of the statewide 
parties.  
Statewide parties provide a stronger link between the sub-systems of the multi-
level party system than autonomist parties or truncated parties, that is, parties which only 
take part in elections at one level. Yet, not all statewide parties have an equally strong 
linkage potential. Some statewide parties provide a more integrated organizational 
structure connecting the various ‘branches’ or levels of the party. Therefore, we need a 
different set of terms to highlight variations in the organizational linkage potential of 
statewide parties. In theory, all parties which take part in statewide and one, several, most 
or all regional elections require some form of vertical integration. Even most autonomist 
parties have distinct ways of organizing as ‘parliamentary parties’ at the statewide and 
regional levels, but tend to have only one party organizational core (executive, 
conference) to coordinate statewide and regional party matters. In comparison, statewide 
parties have distinct organizational branches at the statewide level and in each of the 
regions in which they contest elections. Therefore, statewide parties should provide the 
most extensive forms of vertical and horizontal (inter-regional) policy co-ordination.  
Thorlakson (forthcoming-a) classified statewide parties on the basis of the extent 
to which they are vertically integrated and of the degree of autonomy of the regional 
party branches. Indicators for high levels of vertical integration are shared (as opposed to 
separate) membership structures, shared (as opposed to separate) finances and the 
participation of regional branches into the governance bodies (for instance executive, 
conference) of the statewide party.  Indicators for regional party branch autonomy are the 
extent to which regional branches can operate freely in policy-making, regional 
leadership and candidate selection (Thorlakson, forthcoming-a: 6). Where appropriate, 
the freedom to sign regional coalition deals, or the autonomy to write the regional party 
program (manifestos), may be seen as complementary indicators of autonomy. 
Furthermore, the level at which membership dues are paid, the freedom of the regional 
branches to recruit personnel and raise revenue, and the right to organize and supervise 
sub-regional or local party matters are sometimes listed as additional indicators of 
autonomy (Deschouwer, 2006b: 294; Laffin, Shaw and Taylor, 2007). Table 0.2 
 10 
distinguishes between types of multi-level parties on the basis of their levels of vertical 
integration and the autonomy of the regional party branches.  
 
Table 0.2 about here 
 
Applying vertical integration and autonomy to the party organizational types that 
are mentioned above, we find that in the parties of the split type the regional branches  are 
completely independent from the central party, as a result of which the vertical 
integration is weak to non-existent. At most, the two levels of party may form alliances 
(Thorlakson, forthcoming-a: 7). Even in a confederal party, the locus of the party remains 
unequivocally with the regional party branches. The statewide party branch is subordinate 
to the regional branches and cannot function without their consent. The regional branches 
have a high degree of autonomy and the extent of vertical integration remains relatively 
low. Finally, in a federal party, the statewide party branch is more than the sum of its 
parts and each party level can make final decisions on certain matters. A federal party is a 
statewide party in which the regional branches participate in some decisions of the 
statewide party branch, yet retain sufficient autonomy to adapt their organizational 
structures to the territorial specificities of the electorates which they typically address. 
The higher the autonomy of the regional branches and the stronger their participation in 
the statewide party, the more decentralized the federal party 
Beyond the three party organizational types which Thorlakson suggests, there 
may be scope for an additional type which nonetheless falls short of a unitary party. We 
could conceive of a regionalized party as a statewide party with regional party branches, 
but in which the statewide party branch retains the final say (at least formally) in all party 
organizational matters and with the right to substitute regional branches in case of 
statewide regional disagreement. The statewide party branch may ‘involve’ the regional 
branches in some of its decision-making bodies but not more so than some of the local 
branches or some functional associations (for instance, trade unions, young party 
members or female caucus, and so on). A unitary party would be a party without regional 
party branches at all. This further distinction between a federal party and a regionalized 
party may be useful, as it is plausible that statewide parties in a federal system will give a 
limited form of autonomy to the regional branches while retaining the right to intervene 
in all party matters, thus falling somewhere in between the federal and the unitary ideal-
types. In the remainder of this chapter we focus on the federal and regionalized statewide 
parties alone.  
 
[B]. Closing the Circle: Party Systems, Party Organization and Party Strategy 
 
 We can now see how party systems, party organizations and party strategy 
interact. Statewide parties, especially the federal, regionalized or unitary variants, provide 
a potentially very strong link between the various sub-systems of the multi-level party 
system. Yet, the extent to which they realize this potential depends on their ability to 
gather electoral support across all the regions of the state in statewide and regional 
elections. In turn, that ability hinges on their capacity to establish a cohesive party 
organization which is capable of co-ordinating the activities of the party across the 
various levels and regions of the state and of safeguarding some level of programmatic or 
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ideological cohesiveness. However, statewide parties must also find an organizational 
structure which allows their regional branches sufficient freedom to take into account 
regional specificities (for instance when filing candidates or devising an electoral 
programme for regional elections), without jeopardizing the overall programmatic unity 
of the party. Therefore, a statewide party which operates in a loosely integrated multi-
level party system, that is a system with substantial variation between the subsystems, is 
likely to harm its electoral fortunes when it adopts a unitary or at best regionalized party 
structure. A loosely integrated party system is thus likely to prompt state-wide parties to 
organize as federal, possibly even confederal parties. 
The same observation applies with regard to electoral strategy. In a loosely 
integrated party system, statewide parties will be able to obtain a strong position in the 
regional arena (and play their integrating role) only if they successfully accommodate the 
particularities of the regional electoral arena in which they compete. Still, while a 
regionally diversified campaign strategy is more likely in a federal party, we should not 
disregard the possibility that even a unitary party could decide to tailor its message in 
regional elections to regional sensibilities and to develop distinct regional strategies. 
Paradoxically, to the extent that the statewide party successfully adapts its organization 
and strategy to the multi-levelled and loosely integrated nature of the multi-level party 
system, the overall integration of the system will increase. In other words, the more the 
statewide parties are successful in the various regions, for instance by beating the 
autonomist parties, the more the multi-level party system will become integrated. 
The task of statewide parties to strike a balance between authorizing their regional 
branches to organize and strategize freely and safeguarding the organizational and 
programmatic unity of the party can be expressed by a few powerful metaphors. Carty for 
instance, developed the notion of a ‘franchise’ party, in which the state-wide party branch 
provides ‘a product line, sets standards, manages marketing and advertising’ while local 
regional units (individual franchise) ‘deliver the product to a particular market, invest 
local resources, build an organization focused on the needs and resources of the local 
community’ (Carty, 2004: 10; Fabre, 2008: 28). In this volume, Pieter Van Houten 
introduces a ‘principal-agent’ metaphor to express the same relationship between state-
wide and regional party branches. Arguably this analogy may be appropriate for federal 
or regionalized parties in which the statewide party branch is the ‘principal’ who 
‘delegates’ autonomy to the regional branches whenever such delegation is deemed to 
strengthen the party overall. In confederal parties, on the other hand, the roles are 
reversed and the state-wide party branch operates as the ‘agent’ of the regional branches.   
For the purposes of this volume, we distinguish between three distinct ways in which a 
federal or regionalized party can strategize in response to the multi-layered context in 
which it operates. First, how does the party adapt its organization to the multi-layered 
context in which it operates? Second, does the party convey different campaign messages 
in the statewide and regional election campaigns in which it takes part? Finally, does the 
party support different policies when in office at the statewide and regional levels, and 
(where appropriate) does the party authorize the making of incongruent governing 
coalitions? On each of these questions parties can opt for different degrees of statewide-
regional and inter-regional variation 
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[A] Explaining Variations in the federal party system and the organization and 
electoral strategies of federal or regionalized parties 
 
The multi-levelled nature of the party system, of the organization of statewide 
parties, campaign strategies and policy preferences feature as the key dependent variables 
in the various contributions to this volume. The next logical step is to list hypotheses to 
explain variations in these variables. The explanatory variables can be broken down into 
four major clusters. A first cluster links territorial variations in party systems, party 
organization campaigning and policy to differences in the type of federalism or 
decentralization of the state. A second cluster links party systemic, organizational, 
campaign or policy features to the territorial or social heterogeneity of the society in 
which parties operate. A third cluster puts forward a series of electoral variables, in 
particular the simultaneity of statewide and/or regional elections, and in the case of non-
simultaneity, the timing of regional relative to statewide elections. A fourth and final 
cluster is more party specific: it accounts for variations in organizational decentralization, 
campaigning and party policy by proposing party ideology, party institutionalization and 
incumbency as explanatory factors. In the following section, each of these clusters is 
considered in greater detail. We only present a set of hypotheses but do not predict a 
higher validity for any set of clusters or variables listed therein. Further chapters will 
highlight which variables have the strongest explanatory power when applied to one or a 
small group of relevant cases from Western Europe. 
 
[B] The Territorial Structure of the State  
 
The first hypothesis investigates the correlation between the territorial structure of the 
state and our dependent variables. We can think of three important ways in which the 
distribution of competencies within a state matters: (1) competencies may be distributed 
according to a functional or a jurisdictional design; (2) regional competencies may differ 
in scope, i.e. correspond with different policies or different levels of expenditure 
decentralization (3) competencies may be distributed asymmetrically (see Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001; Watts, 1999 and Swenden, 2006 for comparative typologies).    
 
[C] A functional or jurisdictional federal design 
 
The first variable relates to the difference between a functional (sometimes also 
called co-operative or integrative) and a jurisdictional (sometimes also called dual) design 
(Sawer, 1976; Watts, 1999). In a functional design, most legislation takes the form of 
framework or concurrent legislation, legislative and administrative tasks are typically 
attributed to different levels of government and the regions are financed primarily on the 
basis of shared tax revenues. In a jurisdictional design, the two levels of government are 
disentangled. Each level controls different legislative powers and is responsible for their 
administration. Both levels also have sufficient tax revenue powers to finance the bulk of 
their expenditures. Functional and jurisdictional federalism are ideal types, or rather two 
ends of a continuum. In reality, no federal state provides a pure form of functional or 
jurisdictional federalism. Nonetheless, states clearly occupy different positions on this 
continuum. For instance, in Western Europe, Belgium, Scotland (and especially, but 
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beyond the scope of this volume Switzerland) come closest to the jurisdictional end of the 
continuum, while Germany and Wales are nearer to the functional end. Spain occupies an 
intermediary position.  
If we hypothesize that the organizational structure of the state may bear some 
resemblance to the organizational structure of federal parties, then the autonomy of the 
regional branches should be highest in a jurisdictional design and lowest in a functional 
or co-operative design of federalism. For the same reason, we would expect the multi-
level party system to be less integrated and the strategy of multi-level parties to diverge 
more in a jurisdictional design. Jurisdictional designs also reduce the pressure on the 
making of party politically congruent coalitions across levels of government and are 
conducive to more multi-level variation in party policy. However, since a co-operative 
design gives rise to a stronger interdependence between both levels, the participation of 
the regional branches in statewide party affairs (for instance via guaranteed rights of 
representation in the statewide party executive or conference) should be higher than in a 
jurisdictional setting.  
 
[C] Variations in the scope of decentralization 
 
By itself, the distinction between jurisdictional and co-operative federalism sheds 
light on just one aspect of federal design. The portfolio of competencies which regions 
control can vary substantially from one state to another. Policies such as health, 
education, or transport are capital intensive whereas monument conservation, vocational 
training or housing policies are not (or at least much less so). We define the ‘scope’ of 
federalism by measuring regional public expenditures as a share of all public 
expenditures: the higher the regional shares, the larger the scope of decentralization. 
Accurate comparative data on this indicator are not always easy to obtain (yet better than 
comparative revenue-raising data), and sometimes regional and local expenditures cannot 
be easily disaggregated (see Rodden, 2004 for some critical observations). Yet, 
considering available data from the late 1990s, it appears that regional expenditure levels 
are highest for Belgium (40.8 per cent) and Germany (38 per cent), followed by Spain 
(32.5 per cent), the UK (25 per cent) and Italy (Swenden, 2006: 112). The reported UK 
figure also lists local expenditures. Furthermore, an accurate UK reading would require 
us to separate data for Westminster expenditures benefiting Scotland or Wales from 
expenditures by the Scottish or Welsh governments. It may be assumed that, due to the 
legislative autonomy of Scotland in cost-intensive programs such as health policy and 
education (but not in income replacement schemes), Scottish expenditure levels stand at 
least on a par with the Belgian or German regional expenditure levels. Welsh 
expenditures levels may be lower but not by much, since the main difference between 
Scottish and Welsh devolution refers to the extent of legislative autonomy, not the level 
of regional expenditure.  
Linking the scope of regional competencies to the integration of the federal party 
system and federal party organizational properties we hypothesize that the larger the 
scope, the more disintegrated the federal party system, the more autonomous the regional 
branches and the stronger their capacity to claim a participatory role in statewide party 
affairs. Higher levels of regional expenditure should increase the autonomy of the 
regional party branches since regional party elites control a potentially wider array of 
resources and will be held in higher esteem by the statewide party. For the same reason, a 
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larger scope should also coincide with more territorially diversified campaign strategies 
and a stronger territorial variation in party policy.  
 
[C] Constitutional asymmetry 
 
Finally, not all the regions of a state may have similar levels of institutional or 
constitutional autonomy. Among the sample of West European countries in this study, 
constitutional asymmetry applies to the three historic communities of Spain (the Basque 
Country, Catalonia and Galicia) and Navarre, Scotland and Wales. The highest level of 
constitutional asymmetry is found in the UK (where Scotland has the highest level of 
autonomy but England lacks any form of regional self-rule), followed by Spain (where 
after a period of levelling out, asymmetries have increased again since 2006: Agranoff, 
1999; Colino, forthcoming)   
We hypothesize that in regions with more constitutional autonomy, the party 
system is likely to be most distinctive from the multi-level party system overall, and 
regional branches of federal or regionalized parties will have acquired a special status 
within the party. This should result in higher levels of regional autonomy or special 
participatory rights in statewide organizational affairs which other regional branches lack. 
For the same reason, the electoral strategies of statewide parties in electoral campaigns 
taking place within such regions or the proposed party policies are likely to be more 
distinctive than in regions without such a special level of constitutional autonomy.  
 
[C] The State and the Multi-Level Party System: from correlation to causality?  
 
 In the explanatory model presented above, the state structure is presented as an 
exogenous variable which affects the character of the multi-level party system, as well as 
the territorial organization and strategies of statewide parties. Taking a more longitudinal 
perspective, it is assumed that changes in the party system, party organization or party 
strategy reflect changes in the state structure. Such a viewpoint is consistent with the 
analysis by Chhibber and Kollman, who argue that authority migration, that is the shift of 
competencies from the centre to the regions or vice versa, triggers changes in the party 
system (and not the other way round). For Chhibber and Kollman, ‘voters are more likely 
to support national political parties as the national government becomes more important 
in their lives’ (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004: 222). Put differently, the (de)centralization 
of competencies normally ‘precedes’ the (de)nationalization of the party system. Both 
authors identify four changes that have led to a centralisation of the state and drive the 
nationalization of the party system: war or the threat of war (in particular World Wars I 
and II), economic depression (and in the wake thereof, centralization of economic and 
fiscal powers, as was the case with the New Deal in the US for instance), nation building 
and the development of the welfare state (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004: 227). True, they 
admit that in Britain for instance, statewide parties responded to the threat of the Welsh 
and Scottish nationalists by extending the spending autonomy of the Welsh and Scottish 
office. More generally, they acknowledge that ‘reciprocal causation’ cannot be ruled out, 
since governments devolve or centralize powers and public officers also function as party 
holders. By and large however, important structural changes precipitate changes in the 
nationalization of the party system (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004: 227).  
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The viewpoints of Chibber and Kollman are not shared by everyone. For instance, 
for Caramani decentralization or federalism in Western Europe did not lead to but rather 
contained the regionalization of voting behaviour (Caramani, 2004: 292). Corollary, the 
regionalization of voting behaviour may have preceded decentralization. As an alternative 
explanation one could argue that the crucial issue is not who triggers change, the state (by 
migrating authority) or the voters (by precipitating changes in the party system), but 
rather what are they both responding to? Changes in the party system and 
(de)centralization may both respond to new social cleavages. To the extent that such 
cleavages acquire a more regional or territorial character, the party system and the 
structure of the state in which they are embedded may both denationalize.  
Some contributions to this volume shed light on the relationship between the state, 
the party system and the role of political agency. We take the view that authority 
migration may not be exogenous but can be determined by the dynamics of the multi-
level party system. In other words, a development towards the disintegration of the multi-
level party system could result in demands for more regional autonomy and the 
emergence of dual federalism, whereas a more integrated multi-level party system may 
foster a centralizing federation with the adoption of a rather functional design. In some 
cases, the origins of the federal structure can be traced back to the transition to 
democracy (Germany, Spain), but in other cases the dynamics of the party system seem 
to have played a crucial role (Belgium). In Belgium for instance, the disintegration of the 
multi-level party system preceded the decentralization of the state structure. Hence, the 
state structure adapted to the territorial reorganization of the parties and the development 
of regional variations in the party system (Verleden in this volume).. 
 
[B] The Territorial Heterogeneity of Society 
 
[C] Territorial dimensions of socio-economic and cultural heterogeneity 
 
Constitutional asymmetries do not arise out of the blue. They often reflect 
different social, economic or especially cultural (linguistic, religious) or historical (a 
shared common history predating the emergence of the state) realities confined to one or 
several regions of the state. More in general, even federal or multi-layered states without 
constitutional asymmetry (for example Germany) display regional variations in economic 
development or in the extent to which their citizens identify with the state or a region. 
Such disparities can diminish or increase in time. Likewise the extent to which citizens in 
a region experience regional as opposed to statewide identities is subject to continuous 
change and re-interpretation. The distinctiveness of a political community could also be 
assessed by analyzing the specificities of its civil society and the media (Keating, 
Loughlin and Deschouwer, 2003; Greer, 2007, Erk 2008). Regional economic disparities 
can be measured by comparing regional per capita GRP figures. For EU countries these 
have become widely available through EUROSTAT publications. Regional identity 
figures have been measured by using a variety of survey questions, the best known of 
these remains the Linz-Moreno question on regional identity. It asks citizens to position 
themselves on a five point scale with exclusive identification with the state or region as 
the two outliers and equal identification with the state and region in the middle (Moreno, 
2001). In Western Europe, the levels of identification with the region (either exclusively 
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or predominantly) are highest for the ‘stateless nations’ of the Basque Country, followed 
by Catalonia and Scotland. Galicia, Flanders and Wales generally display slightly lower 
levels of regional identity, but significantly higher than Wallonia or most of the other 
Spanish regions. Unfortunately, comparable data are missing for the federal states of 
Austria, Germany and Switzerland (at least as measured within each of the Länder or 
cantons of the state) and also for Italy. One may assume that in Italy and Germany, the 
more important territorial cleavage respectively sets the Northern regions apart from the 
South or the East from the West (Gold, 2003; Hough and Koß in this volume).  
Linking inter-regional variations in identity and socio-economic development to 
party systemic and organizational features generates the expectation that a more 
territorially heterogeneous society coincides with a less integrated multi-level party 
system (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In turn, a territorially less integrated multi-level party 
system affects the organizational, electoral and policy strategies of statewide parties. 
There are two conditions under which statewide party organizations may be tempted to 
give their regional branches more autonomy. First, when the support for statewide parties 
varies substantially across the regions of the state and second, when regional variations in 
electoral support are caused primarily by variations in the strength of autonomist parties. 
The first condition may arise when the party systems in several regions of the 
state are more skewed towards the left or right than the overall multi-level party system. 
Parties of the right may feel tempted to advocate more left-wing positions when they are 
competing in a predominantly left-wing electoral environment and vice versa. In order to 
enable such strategic electoral choices, one can expect regional party branches to seek 
maximal autonomy from the statewide party branches in terms of candidate selection, 
campaigning, or regional policy making.  
The same observations apply a fortiori when variations in regional support are due 
to competition from autonomist parties. Here, statewide parties must not only provide 
choices with regard to the left-right dimension, but also with respect to how to position 
themselves on matters dealing with regional autonomy  
 
[C] Variations in the size of regional electorates  
 
Regions can be distinguished from each other on the basis of more than just their 
socio-economic or cultural distinctiveness alone. All multi-layered states are to some 
extent asymmetric insofar as their regions are not equally significant in electoral terms. 
For instance, taken together Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland make up less than 15 
percent of the UK population, whereas North Rhine-Westphalia alone is more populous 
than all of the East German Länder combined. It is not difficult to see how differences in 
demography may be reflected within federal party organizations. For instance, from the 
viewpoint of the German SPD, North Rhine-Westphalia is not only a traditional electoral 
stronghold, but it also houses the SPD regional branch with the largest membership base. 
Therefore, one may assume that the NRW SPD wields more influence (participation) in 
the statewide party than the other regional branches. On the other hand, the German SPD 
may be compelled to keep a closer eye on the NRW party branch than on any of the other 
branches since the outcome of regional elections in NRW will send larger shockwaves 
through the German multi-level party system than say elections in Bremen (this was 
exemplified in 2005, when then SPD Chancellor Schröder triggered the dissolution of the 
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federal parliament after his party lost badly in NRW regional elections). Because of this 
interdependence, the autonomy of the NRW branch (organizationally and in policy terms) 
could be smaller than that of the Bremen branch and its electoral campaign may be 
steered more by the statewide party. For the same reason, it is sometimes said that 
Scottish regional party branches can get away with more because Scottish voters 
represent a relatively small share of the electorate and Scottish politics is not frequently 
reported in the London-based British political press (Van Biezen and Hopkin, 2006). 
Smallness, however, should also weaken their capacity to participate in statewide party 
affairs. 
 
[B] Statewide Party Organizations, Simultaneity and Cycles 
 
The way in which statewide party organizations operate internally may be 
affected by the timing of regional relative to statewide elections. Three scenarios are 
possible: statewide and all regional elections coincide (a situation which Kris 
Deschouwer has referred to as ‘vertical simultaneity’), all regional elections coincide 
(‘horizontal simultaneity’) but are held independently from statewide elections, or each or 
at least a clear majority of regional elections are held separately (and separately from 
statewide elections).  
Where statewide and regional elections coincide, the process of candidate 
selection for both sets of elections may coincide or is at the very least co-ordinated 
between both levels. The same applies to drafting party programs for statewide and 
regional elections (Deschouwer 2003 and 2006a: 296-7). Consequently, the autonomy of 
the regional party branches is likely to be lower and the coordinating role of the statewide 
party is likely to be stronger. When statewide and regional elections do not coincide but 
all regional elections are held simultaneously, the statewide party is likely to take an 
exceptionally high interest in the election, given that the regional elections will be 
perceived as a crucial popularity test for the incumbent central government. 
Consequently, the statewide party may wish to coordinate regional campaign themes and 
intervene in processes of regional candidate selection. Finally, the autonomy of the 
regional branches should be highest where regional elections take place independently 
from statewide elections and are held independently from each other. 
In the event of non-simultaneity, the timing of a regional election relative to that 
of a statewide election is likely to be of significance. Where statewide and regional 
elections do not coincide, the propensity of the statewide party to intervene is likely to be 
larger, the closer the election is held after, but especially before the statewide election. In 
the latter case, the election will be seen as an important indicator of future statewide 
electoral performance, in the former case it will be seen as a confirmation of past 
statewide electoral success or failure (Deschouwer, 2006a: 297). One may add that 
regional elections can also gain in relevance the stronger they generate direct and 
immediate policy repercussions at the statewide level. For instance, the best example 
occurs when a German regional election if lost or won tilts the balance in favour of the 
incumbent central government or opposition parties in the German second chamber. 
Whenever a regional election takes on such a character, the German media will give it 
more attention and the party leaders of the statewide incumbent or opposition parties will 
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more likely appear during the campaign, seeking to influence the regional party program 
and to intervene in the process of government formation  
Finally, it is sometimes suggested that the choice of electoral system (proportional 
representation or majoritarian) affects the vertical integration of statewide parties and the 
autonomy of their regional branches. PR systems tend to centralize powers within the 
party organization whereas majoritarian systems typically provide a stronger role for 
local or constituency associations especially in the process of candidate selection. Yet, 
the effect of the electoral system on the autonomy of the regional branches of multi-level 
parties must be carefully studied from party to party. For instance, an important aspect of 
candidate selection in majoritarian systems takes place at the constituency level whereas 
party executives play a comparatively larger role in drafting lists for PR elections. If the 
making of lists for statewide or regional elections is coordinated at the regional and not 
the statewide party level, the autonomy of the regional branches remains intact. In fact, 
such a party would be more decentralized than a statewide party with the ability to amend 
candidates for central or regional office who were proposed by sub-regional constituency 
associations. 
The choice of electoral system has a more profound effect on the need for 
building coalition governments after the elections. Since plurality elections are more 
likely to produce a clear winner, the ‘need’ for statewide parties to interfere in the 
formation of a regional government is expected to be much lower than if regional 
elections are held by PR.  In addition, a PR system can also be expected to lead to a more 
fragmented party system and more in particular facilitate the rise of autonomist parties. 
 
[B] Statewide Party Organizations: Party Ideology, Development and Incumbency 
 
[C] Incumbency  
 
The autonomy of regional party branches is not fixed. Whether or not the statewide 
and/or regional branches of a party hold office is likely to have a profound effect on the 
level of regional party branch autonomy. The following table summarizes the four 
possible configurations. We discuss the hypothesized repercussions of each configuration 
for the level of autonomy of regional branches and their participation in the statewide 
party in turn.  
 
Table 0.3 about here 
 
A party is most vulnerable to central-regional disagreements when its central and 
regional party branches participate in government (scenario 1). Internal party 
disagreements could generate genuine policy disagreements and produce deadlock or 
contradictory public and party policy. Therefore, the statewide party may want to 
constrain the autonomy of the regional branches while avoiding open conflict by 
strengthening their participation in statewide party affairs. The statewide party branch is 
expected to keep a close eye on the campaign themes which the regional party develops. 
Conversely, the autonomy of regional party branches in campaigning, pre-selecting 
candidates and where appropriate regional coalition building or developing deviant party 
policy should be highest when the statewide party and its regional branches occupy the 
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opposition benches at both levels (scenario 4). However, the regional party branches are 
likely to participate less in statewide party matters since the consequences which could 
emerge from a lack of intra-party coordination between levels are less damaging.  
We hypothesize that a regional branch which participates in a regional government, 
but cohabits with a statewide party in opposition should have considerable autonomy 
(scenario 2). Due to its role in government, the regional party branch has access to 
informational and material resources which the statewide party branch is lacking. The 
policy-making expertise of the regional office holders could be of enormous benefit to the 
statewide party. Therefore, their participation in the statewide party is likely to increase 
as a result. In contrast, a regional party branch in opposition which cohabits with a 
statewide party in office (scenario 3) is more constrained to take issue with statewide 
party policy. Such a stance would clearly undermine the authority of the statewide party 
where it matters the most: in government. Therefore, the statewide party may seek to 
limit the level of regional party branch autonomy, without involving these branches to the 
same extent in statewide party affairs as in scenario 1.  
 
[C] Party Ideology 
 
 Not all party ideologies are equally supportive of regionalism. One can at least 
hypothesize that statewide parties that are more supportive of regionalism or territorial 
politics are also more likely to organize internally along regional lines. Therefore, the 
more a party favours territorial autonomy, the stronger its regional party branches and the 
stronger their involvement in statewide party matters. On the whole, Labour and 
Conservative parties are expected to be less receptive to regional autonomy than Liberal 
or Christian-Democratic parties. Mass parties by origin (though in the meantime catchall 
or even cartel parties), Labour parties are externally created and have continued to use 
their broad links to trade unions as a means to mobilize electoral support (Krouwel, 2006: 
254). Furthermore, Social-Democratic parties are inclined to prioritize ‘inter-personal’ 
solidarity rather than territorial autonomy. For instance, several representatives of the 
German SPD who participated in the Parliamentary Council (1948) to debate a draft West 
German constitution vehemently opposed federalism (Niclauß, 1998). Or, to list another 
example, in the UK, several Labour party politicians (including prominent Scottish or 
Welsh Labour figures, such as the later party leader Neil Kinnock) rejected devolution 
when it was first proposed in the 1970s.  
By comparison, the resistance to territorial autonomy among Conservative parties 
corresponds with their concern to uphold traditional notions of sovereignty. Among 
plurinational states, sovereignty is more closely associated with statewide symbols such 
as the monarchy, the central parliament, the military, a majority language, and where 
appropriate, the reverence of Empire (in which the majority nation took a lead role). Each 
of these values is linked more closely with a centralized than a decentralized political 
regime. On such grounds, and because of that party’s historical connection to Francoism, 
we would expect the Partido Popular to be the most centralized of the two major Spanish 
statewide parties. However, in the UK, the structure of the Conservative Party is not 
necessarily the least decentralized of the statewide parties. Although the Conservatives 
were united in their opposition to devolution (at least until 1999), until 1965, the Scottish 
Conservatives – then known as the Scottish Unionist Party – were a quasi independent 
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party that was only loosely associated with the Conservative Party in England and Wales 
(Seawright, 2004; Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006). Its Scottish identity was played out 
handily during the 1950s, when a British Labour government embarked upon 
nationalization policies which affected Scottish run businesses and council-run services 
(Seawright, 2004). In the 1955 statewide elections, the party polled 50.1 percent of the 
Scottish vote. Yet, with Conservatives in power in London and the Empire in decline, the 
capacity to pull the Scottish vote waned, and by the mid 1960s the party had lost much of 
its electoral appeal in Scotland.  
Christian-Democratic parties should be distinguished from Conservative parties. 
Although frequently characterized as mass or catch-all parties, Christian-Democrats 
generally support ‘subsidiarity’. This doctrine, which originates from Catholic thought, 
supports policy-making at the lowest possible level. Therefore, Christian-Democratic 
parties could be expected to be more supportive of regional branch autonomy and policy-
making than Social-Democratic parties (Schmid, 1990, Dachs, 2003).  
Finally, ‘Liberal’ parties should be more open to internal dissent, discussion and 
deliberative decision-making. For instance, the British Liberal-Democrats have been a 
federal party for a long time, both in their internal organization and in their preferred 
political structure for the UK (a legacy which dates back Gladstone’s home rule). The 
same observation applied to the Austrian Liberals before it drifted off into more populist 
and even extreme right wing waters (Höbelt, 2002). However, in Germany, the electoral 
success of the Liberals was primarily built on its status as a kingmaker in federal, less so 
in regional coalition-building. Furthermore, the party never developed a significant 
membership base. When it did so in East Germany shortly after unification (partially due 
to the enormous popularity of foreign minister Genscher there) the internal party 
organizational and decision-making structures remained quite centralized and elitist. In 
the view of Hopper, the party’s refusal to adjust its organizational structure has 
contributed to its rapid decline of support in the East and the declining influence of the 
East German party branches within the Liberal statewide party organization (Hopper, 
2001). 
 
[C] Party Development and Institutionalization 
 
   The above examples suggest that by itself ideology is not a strong enough 
predictor of party organizational decentralization or campaigning. There is always a 
contextual element that needs to be taken into account. For instance, since the PSOE was 
outlawed during the Franco regime and deprived of executive power at the statewide 
level until December 1982, regional party branches could be involved more easily in the 
build up of the post-Franco party structures (Gunther, Montero and Botella, 2004, but 
Fabre and Mendez-Lago in this volume). For some regional party chiefs this influence 
outlived the entry of the PSOE in central government (after which the PSOE became a 
more centralized party). Regional barons used their party influence to extract policy 
concessions from the statewide government. One could argue that, due to its origins in 
the Spanish political system, the PSOE was bound to develop a more decentralized 
organizational structure than its Conservative archrival. Statewide electoral successes 
accelerated a process of organizational centralization, just as the centralized nature of the 
German FDP has been attributed in part to its long time role as a kingmaker in statewide 
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elections (Hopper 2001). Similarly, since the German SPD did not take part in a federal 
coalition until 1966, the regional party branches (which often participated in regional 
coalitions) built up an important reservoir of policy expertise that came in handily when 
Brandt steered the party towards federal electoral victory. Willy Brandt, who once headed 
the Berlin regional government, recognized the relevance of regional party branches and 
leaders in presenting the SPD as a credible alternative to the Christian-Democrats at the 
statewide level (Lösche and Walter 1992: 234-235). The autonomy of the regional 
branches even increased after Brandt became party president and successfully pushed 
through internal party and ideological reforms. Simultaneously, the party (and the people 
at large) looked upon federalism as a more favourable institutional device (Conradt, 
2005: 274).  
 Finally, although path-dependent logics make parties inimical to structural 
change, parties also operate in an increasingly volatile environment, and unlike other 
‘public sector institutions’ (for instance ministerial departments or agencies) are subject 
to direct and recurrent electoral accountability. It has been suggested that in order to cope 
with these new external challenges, most West European parties developed from mass 
into electoralist catch all parties and by now obtained the features of a cartel party 
(Krouwel, 2006 for a comprehensive overview, also Katz and Mair 1995 for an 
exploration of the cartel party and Detterbeck, 2005 for a powerful critique). In cartel 
parties power typically moves away from the party organization (especially the party 
activists) to the party office holders. However, a second feature relates to the vertical 
stratarchy of different party levels. According to this thesis each level (statewide or 
regional) should be free to devise its own political strategies and strategic questions, 
including candidate selection and policy-making (Katz and Mair, 1995: 21; Detterbeck, 
2005: 174-5). However, one could hypothesize that the degree of decentralisation and 
concomitant strategic divergence will depend on how the party was organised in the past.  
Arguably, for parties that developed into strong and centralised mass-parties it will be 
less evident to adapt their organisation and strategy to a decentralised state-structure. 
 
[A] Overview of the Contributions 
 
 In the previous sections, we set out an ambitious research agenda with respect to 
studying multi-level party systems and the organization, strategy or policies of statewide 
parties which compete in statewide and regional elections. The chapters in this volume do 
not apply this framework to each of the West European federal party systems or the 
statewide parties which are vying for votes and office within them. Instead, we present 
evidence from five important federal or quasi-federal states of Western Europe: Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Our chapters are comparative in a sense 
that each of them focuses on the electoral performance, strategy or organization of more 
than just one statewide party. Some chapters purposefully adopt a cross-national 
approach by combining evidence from Belgium and Spain (Deschouwer), Spain and the 
UK (Fabre and Mendéz-Lago), Spain and Germany (Van Houten, Stefuriuc). Other 
chapters present evidence from a single country study, but always do so with a broader 
theoretical or comparative framework in mind. The order in which the chapters are 




[B] Party System Analyses 
 A first group of two chapters is concerned with an analysis of multilevel party 
systems. In the first contribution, Kris Deschouwer addresses Caramani’s nationalization 
thesis by testing whether nationalization can be observed where it is expected the least: 
Belgium and Spain. Both states have undergone a rather radical regionalization or even 
federalization process in recent decades and therefore the question arises whether we can 
observe an effect of the regionalization of their political systems on the outcomes of 
state-wide elections? Deschouwer develops a set of measurements to establish (1) 
whether the outcome of statewide elections reflects regional differences and (2) if so, 
whether the territorial heterogeneity of statewide electoral results has been increasing 
across time. Although the Belgian parties are no longer statewide, their inclusion is 
warranted, since parties still behave as ‘party families’: ideologically related parties from 
both sides of the language border end up together in federal government or opposition, at 
least until 2007. Furthermore, since the Belgian statewide parties split between 1968 and 
1978, but the electoral time series goes back to 1949 we can indeed consider to what 
extent the split of the parties coincides with or rather is preceded by a regionalization of 
national electoral results.  
 Deschouwer’s chapter is concerned with developments in the statewide party 
system in two states which have decentralized in recent decades. In their contribution, 
Hough and Koß consider whether similar developments can be observed in Germany, a 
more ‘stable’ federation in terms of the scope of regional autonomy in recent decades. In 
contrast with Deschouwer both authors analyze electoral trends in the statewide and 
regional party systems. By doing so, they pay attention to the concern that even if no 
significant trends in the ‘regionalization’ of the statewide party system may be observed, 
voters could nonetheless increasingly display features of ‘multi-level’ voting behavior, 
that is approach regional elections without clear reference to statewide party politics. By 
adopting a multi-level approach, Hough and Koß analyze the effect of German 
unification on the integration of the German party system. Their analysis compares 
electoral trends before and after unification and, in the case of the latter, also compares 
developments between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ German Länder.  
 
[B] The Organization of Statewide parties in the context of a multi-level system 
 A second group of five chapters is concerned with how statewide parties organize 
in light of having to compete for votes and office in a multi-layered structure. The first 
three of these chapters provide a general overview on how statewide parties have adapted 
their organization to the regionalized or federal nature of the state in which they operate. 
 
 In a first contribution Detterbeck and Jeffery build upon the preceding analysis by 
Hough and Koß. They focus on the extent to which German unification sent shockwaves 
through the German political system and especially prompted a recalibration of German 
federalism. However, contrary to Hough and Koß, their unit of analysis is the adaptation 
of the statewide parties, not the German party system. After unification, Germany has 
become a much more territorially heterogeneous society. They analyze the extent to 
which the German statewide parties have organized differently as a result. 
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 In the next contribution, Jonathan Hopkin provides one of the first – if not the first 
– account of the territorial organization of Italian statewide parties. His analysis provides 
meaningful insights on the assumed relationship between the gradual decentralization of 
the state and adjustments in the internal organization of statewide parties. Like the 
chapter on the German parties (in which unification features as a ‘critical juncture’) 
Hopkin’ distinguishes between two radically different periods. However, the critical 
juncture is related less to specific changes in the territorial organization of the state, than 
in the implosion of the old party system and the change of electoral system in 1993. 
Therefore the effect of regionalization on the party system is considered separately for the 
First and Second Republic.  
 In a third contribution, Fabre and Méndez-Lago focus on the territorial 
organization of the leading UK and Spanish statewide parties. The degree of autonomy of 
the regional party branches (‘self-rule’) is compared with their levels of participation 
(‘shared rule’ or ‘vertical integration’) in the statewide party branch. Their evidence is 
presented in light of some hypotheses that were outlined above: what is the effect of 
constitutional asymmetry, of incumbency at the statewide and regional levels and of party 
ideological traditions on how these statewide parties organize internally?  
 The fourth chapter in this group revisits the UK case, but focuses on one 
important aspect: candidate selection. Candidate selection, Gallagher and Marsh once 
famously said, is the ‘secret garden’ of politics (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). That garden 
has become less secret in recent years, as more publications have become available which 
analyze how parties select candidates for statewide elections (Rahat and Hazan, 2001; 
Bille, 2001). In his contribution, Jonathan Bradbury sheds light on how the British 
statewide parties adapted their candidate selection procedures since they have had to 
organize for UK devolved elections. By doing so his analysis ‘corrects’ the statewide bias 
which thus far prevailed in most research on candidate selection. He also considers the 
link between constitutional asymmetry (Scotland versus Wales) and party ideology on 
selecting candidates for regional elections. Bradbury challenges the hypotheses that the 
cartelization of parties coincides with a more stratarchical relationship. Relying on more 
recent writings of Katz (2001), he argues that in parties which adopt a more cartelized 
profile, central party elites do not refrain from pushing through candidate selection 
reforms for electoral reasons  
 In the final contribution to this section, Frederik Verleden analyzes the conditions 
under which the Belgian statewide parties split along linguistic lines between 1968 and 
1978. The break up of statewide parties in a unitary political system raises an important 
puzzle for analysts who posit a causal link between authority migration and party system 
(de)nationalization. The contribution by Verleden suggests that to answer this puzzle we 
must consider ‘authority migration’ within party organizational structures and not just 
within the state as a whole. More specifically, to what extent were the Belgian statewide 
parties already organized as ‘federal’ or ‘confederal’ parties before they broke up and 
what triggered their break up?    
  
[B] Campaign Strategy and Policy  
  
 The final section brings together four chapters which focus more broadly on the 
relationship between the statewide party and its regional branches in a context of having 
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to fight elections (campaign strategy) and to make policy at different levels and 
distinctive territorial political contexts.  
 The first contribution, by Pieter Van Houten applies a ‘principal-agent’ 
framework to demonstrate the intricate relationship between the statewide and regional 
party branches on policy issues that touch the core of regional autonomy. He first 
considers to what extent the German state-wide parties sought influencing the viewpoints 
of the party controlled Länder-governments when these were asked to formulate their 
position on some proposals affecting their own financing. He then turns to the very 
sensitive negotiations between the Spanish Social-Democrats and their semi-autonomous 
regional party branch on revising the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in 2005-2006. By 
focusing on three policy issues of intra party contention, Van Houten investigates the 
conditions under which the state-wide party principal can or cannot assert ‘his’ autonomy 
vis-à-vis the regional agents.  
 
 The next chapter in this cluster stays with the German and Spanish case studies, 
yet focuses on a different dimension of regional party branch autonomy: regional 
coalition building. Spanish and German regional elections are held by proportional 
representation (albeit skewed in a majoritarian direction in the former), and as a result 
frequently necessitate the building of regional coalitional governments. However, can 
regional party branches build the coalitions of their choice, or are they constrained in this 
respect by the desires of the statewide party? The relatively high level of interlocking 
between the state-wide and regional policy levels in both polities provides statewide party 
branches with an incentive to prefer the ‘politically most reliable’ (read party politically 
congruent) coalitions at the regional level also. Yet, regional party branches may opt for  
incongruent coalitions because the outcome of regional elections leaves them with no 
choice or because they prefer such coalitions for electoral or policy reasons . Relying on 
interviews with key policy makers in two Spanish and two German regions Ştefuriuc 
considers why and under which conditions regional party branches are more likely to opt 
for making regional coalitions that are incongruent to statewide coalitions. 
 The final two chapters in the section focus specifically on the electoral strategy of 
statewide parties in regional elections of multinational states. Campaign strategies are 
analyzed by studying the content of party manifestos for statewide and regional elections. 
To this purpose, both chapters analyze regional party manifestos, built upon the well 
known methodology of the Comparative Manifesto Project. Rather than copying the 
CMP issue categorization, Bart Maddens and his team redefined issue categories in a way 
which makes them more amenable to the comparative analysis of regional party 
manifestoes. For each statewide party, issue profiles are drawn up which map the salience 
(that is the frequency) with which certain issue categories (for instance social security, 
foreign policy and so on) are listed in their manifestos for statewide and regional 
elections. In addition, each issue is screened on its position (direction) on the regionalist 
issue, i.e. on the view that parties take with regard to the current levels of regional 
autonomy (institutional dimension) and to the strengthening of a regional (cultural or 
linguistic) identity. Combining salience and position generates a measure of directional 
intensity. In the first of two contributions, Maddens and Libbrecht analyze the strategy of 
the Spanish statewide parties with regard to the regionalist issue, i.e. the extent to which 
statewide parties either support more regional autonomy or regional culture and identity 
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in regional and statewide elections. In a second contribution, Fabre and Martínez consider 
the strategy of UK statewide parties with respect to their salience profiles overall (that is 
on all issues in a party manifesto) and with respect to the directional intensity on the 
regionalist issue.   
 The conclusion to this volume by the editors seeks to tie the various approaches 
together and where possible to address (some of) the hypotheses that were outlined 
above. It also identifies unresolved puzzles or additional questions on party (system) 





Table 0.1 Classification of West European Parties on the basis of territorial pervasiveness 
and participation in elections 
  Participation in Elections 

























PRi (Partido Riojano) 
 CSU, SNP, PC, BNG, 
CiU, ERC, PNV, EA 
Some Regions   PDS,  
Belgian parties 
Most Regions   CDU, Conservatives, 
Labour, Liberal-
Democrats, PP, PSOE 
All Regions   SPD, FDP, Die Linke,  
IU 
Source: own elaboration from Deschouwer 2006b: 292. The classification of the PRi and PRC is based on 
their participation in the most recent set of regional and statewide elections alone. The PRi participated in 
statewide elections, but not after 2000; the PRC did not participate in statewide elections after 1993. Also, 
the EA and PNV have participated in regional elections in Navarre (albeit under a different name). The 
PDS filed candidates across all regions in statewide elections, but failed to gain representation in the 
Western Länder 
 
Table 0.2 Typology of statewide parties based on levels of vertical integration and 
autonomy of the regional branches  
 
 Typology of statewide parties  
Split Confederal Federal Regionalized Unitary 
Vertical 
Integration 
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Low, 
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Table 0.3 Combination Matrix Government and Opposition 
 




 GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION 
GOVERNMENT Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
OPPOSITION Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
 
 
 
